UIdaho Law

Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs

11-13-2008

Callies v. O'Neal Respondent's Brief Dckt. 34968

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
Recommended Citation
"Callies v. O'Neal Respondent's Brief Dckt. 34968" (2008). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs. 1796.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/1796

This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact
annablaine@uidaho.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT FOR THE STATE OF IDAHO

RANDY CALLIES, TRICIA CALLIES.
CHRISTOPHER PLANINSHEK, DAWN
PLANINSHEK and HERON STREET
PROPERTIES, LTD, LC.,

I
Supreme Court Docket No.: 34968

I

vs.
GEORGE P. O'NEAL; CHARTER
BUILDERS, INC., an Idaho Corporation;
PHEASANT RUN, LLC; SHAKESPEARE
CONDOMINIUMS, LLC; HAMPTON
PLACE, LLC; SILVER OAKS, LLC; CBIBVBI, LLC; FOXBORO, LLC; CRYSTAL
BLW, LLC; and CHARTER POINTE
APARTMENTS, LLC,

Respondents' Brief
Appeal from District Court of the Fourth Judicial District
in and for Ada County
The Honorable Kathryn Sticklen, District Judge, Presiding

Jeffrey A. Strother
Thomas V. Munson
Strother Law Office
200 North 4" Street, Suite 30
Boise, Idaho 83702
Phone: (208) 342-2425
Facsimile: (208) 342-2429
Attorney(s) for Appellants

TJ Angstman
Erin J. Wynne
Angstman, Johnson, & Associates, PLLC
3649 Lakeharbor Lane
Boise, Idaho 83703
Phone: (208) 384-8588
Facsimile: (208) 853-0117
Attorney(?.) for Respondents

TABLE OF CONTENTS

P. STATEMENT OF THE CASE ........................................................................... 1
Nature of the Case...........................................................................................................1
Course of Proceedings .................................................................................................... 1
Statement of Facts ........................................................................................................... 3
2. ISSUES PIdESENTED ON APPEAL ......................................................................5
3 . S T A m A R D OF REVIEW .......................................................................................6
4 . ARGUMENT ............................................................................................................. 6
The Trial Court Was Correct When it Held There Was No Genuine Issue of Material
Fact in the Record Which Would Have Precluded the Court from Granting Summary
Judgment ............................................................................................6
Idaho Code $ 54-2050 is the Controlling Statute Regarding the Sufficiency of
Brokerage Representation Agreements. is Unambiguous and Should Be Interpreted
as the Legislature Intended .......................................................................9
The Trial Court Was Correct in Concluding that the Listing Agreements Were
Unenforceable Due to the Lack of Valid and Enforceable Legal Descriptions of the
Properties.......................................................................................... 13
The Trial Court Correctly Ruled that Par01 and Extrinsic Evidence Could Not be
Admitted to Snpply a Legal Description to the Agreements ............................... 14
The Trial Court Was Correct in Dismissal of CPM's Claiins to Recover on the
Theories of Quasi Estoppel and the Doctrine of Part Performance ....................... 17
Quasi Estoppel Does Not Apply Where There is No Enforceable Underlying
Agreement..................................................................................19
CPM is Not Entitled to Attorney Fees and Costs Pursuant to the Agreements Due
to the Unenforceability of the Agreements...................................................21
CBI is Entitled to an Award of Attorneys' Fees and Costs on Appeal Pursuant to
I.A.R. 40 and41 ..................................................................................22
The Court Should Award CBI Reasonable Attorneys' Fees and Costs lncurred in
This Appeal. Pursuant to I.A.R. 40. I.A.R. 41. Idaho Code 5 12-120(3) and
Idaho Code 5 12-121.............................................................................22

.

5

CONCLUSION .............................................................................. 23

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CAses
Allen v. Kitchen. 16 Idaho 133. 100 P. 1052 (1909)...................................... .14. 15
Atwood v. Snzith. 143 Idaho 110. 138 P.3d 310 (2006)................................... .17. 19
B a t e r v. Craney. 135 Idaho 1.66. 16 P.3d 263 (2000)...........................................6
Black Canyon Racquetball v. First Nat'l. 119 Idaho 171. 804 P.2d 900 (1991) ............20
Brower v. E.I. DuPont De Nemouurs & Co.. 117 Idaho 780. 792 P.2d 345 (1990))...... 22
Central Idaho Agency. Inc. v. Turner. 92 Idaho 306. 442 P.2d 442
(1968)............................................................................. 9. 10. 11. 15. 16. 17
C & G. Inc. v. Canyon Highway Dist. No . 4. 139 Idaho 140. 75 P.3d 194 (2003).........19
Day v. Mortgage Ins. Corp.. 91 Idaho 605. 428 P.2d 524 (1967)............................20
Doe v. City of Elk River. 144 Idaho 337. 160 P.3d 1272 (2007)............................... 6
East Lizard Butte Water Corp. v. Howell. 122 Idaho 679. 837 P.2d 805 (1992)............6
Gamer v. Bartschi. 139 Idaho 430. 80 P.3d 1031 (2003)............9. 11. 14. 15. 17.22. 23
Good v. liiznsen. 110 Idaho 953. 719 P.2d 1213 (Idaho App..1986). ......................... 8
Hartley v. Miller-Stephan. 107 Idaho 688. 692 P.2d 332 (1984)............................. 10
Hilbert v. Hough. 132 Idaho 203. 207. 969 P.2d 836. 840 (Ci.App.1998)..................22
Keesee v. Fetzek. 111 Idaho 360. 362. 723 P.2d 904. 906 (Ct.App.1986).................. 19
Kolln v. Saint Luke's Regional Medical Center. 130 Idaho 323. 940 P.2d 1142 (1997)....6
Laker Land & Loans v. Nye. 40 Idaho 793. 237 P. 630 (1925) ...............................17
Lexington Heights Development. LLC v. Crandlemire. 140 Idaho 276. 92 P.3d 526
(2004).......................................................................................... 14. 15
Lettunich v. Key Bank Nat . Ass'n. 141 Idaho 362. 109 P.3d 1104 (2005) ...............20. 21
Lloyd v. DeMott. 124 Idaho 62. 856 P.2d 99 (1993)............................................. 6
Medical Services Group. Inc. v. Boise Lodge No . 310. Benev . and Protective Order Elks.
126 Idaho 90. 878 P.2d 789 (1994)........................................................... 19. 20
Murphy v. Livesay. 34 Idaho. 793. 197 P. 536 (1921).......................................... 17
Robison v. Frasier. 89 Idaho 326. 404 P.2d 877 (1965) ....................................... 17
Smith v. Boise Kenworth Sales. Inc.. 102 Idaho 63. 625 P.2d 417 (1981).................. 20
State v. Roderick. 85 Idaho 80. 375 P.2d 1005 (1962) ......................................... 12
Surety Life Ins. Co. v. Rose Chapel Mortuary. Inc., 95 Idaho 599. 514 P.2d 594
(1973).............................................................................................. 20
Thomas v. Arkoosh Produce. Inc.. 137 Idaho 352. 48 P.3d 1241 (2002).................... 19
Thomson v. Idaho Ins. Agency. Inc.. 126 Idaho 527. 887 P.2d 1034 (1994)).................. 6
Tommerup v. Albertson's. Inc.. 101 Idaho 1. 607 P.2d 1055 (1980)......................... 20
Walker v . Nationwide Financial Corporation of Idaho. 102 Idaho 266. 629 P.2d 662
(1981) ................................................................................................. 10
Weatherhead v. Cooney. 32 Idaho 127. 180 P. 760 (1919).............................. .17. 18
White v. Rehn. 103 Idaho 1. 644 P.2d 323 (1982).............................................7. 8

Idaho Code 5 9-503...................................................................................
5. 11. 12. 13. 17
Idaho Code § 9-508............................................................................... 9. 10, 11, 12. 13, 17
Idaho Code 5 12-120(3)................................................................................................ 5. 22
Idaho Code 5 12-121......................................................................................................... 23
Idaho Code 5 54-2050............................................................. 5. 7, 9, 10. 11. 12, 13, 16, 17

TREATISES

41 A.L.R. 2d 905.................................................................................. 18
Restatement. Agency 5 468. Comment subsec (2) ........................................... 18
Restatement. Contracts 5 355 (3). Illustration 7 .............................................. 18

Page iv

I.
!

S T A T E m N T OF THE CASE
1.

Nature qf the Case.

I

This case is an appeal from orders of the trial court granting Respondents Charter
I

Builders, Inc., Charter Pointe Apartments, LLC and Silver Oaks, LLC's (collectively
"CBI") motion for summary judgment on Appellants Complete Property Management

;

and Investment Realty, Inc. and Tricia Callies' (hereinafter collectively "CPM) claims
for unpaid coim~ssionsby CBI, due to the lack of a legally enforceable description of
the properties on the listing agreements.
This appeal presents issues governed by existing legal principles. This case does
NOT involve issues of substantial public interest, matters of first impression, issues of
constitutional interpretation, questions of validity of statutes or ordinances, or any
inconsistency in decisions of the Court of Appeals or Supreme Court.
ii.

Course of Proceedings

On or about March 1, 2005, CPM, and the Respondent, CBI, as managing
member of Charter Pointe and Silver Oaks, executed two RE-16 Exclusive Seller
Representation Agreements (hereinafter "Agreements"); one for the property owned by
Charter Pointe and one for the property owned by Silver Oaks. (R. Ex. 2, q[q[ 3,s). At the
time of execution of the Agreements there was no legal description attached to the

II

Agreements as addendums as noted on line 13, page 1 of said Agreements. (R. Ex. 2, ¶q[

4, 6).
Callies and CPM filed suit on October 3, 2006 against a myriad of defendants,

I

I

including CBI, Charter Pointe and Silver Oaks, in the Fourth Judicial District in the State
of Idaho, County of Ada, Case No. CV OC 0618504. (R., Vol. I, pp. 20-29). On

Page 1

November 8, 2006 CPM filed suit in the Fourth Judicial District Court in the State of

1

11

Idaho, County of Ada, Case No. CV OC 0620977, against CBI, Charter Pointe and Silver
Oaks, among other parties, seeking to recover commissions CPM claims they were owed.

I/

(R., Vof. I., pp. 78-117). On November 16, 2006, CBI filed an answer and counterclaim

j
7

against CPM and Callies in Case No. CV OC 0618504, seeking a declaratoryjudgment as

to the validity of the Agreements. (R., Vol. I, pp. 30-55). Those two cases were later

3

consolidated with a third separate action pending simultaneously. (R. Vol. I, pp. 6, 64,
f
)

77).
On April 18, 2007, CBI, Charter Pointe and Silver Oaks filed a motion for

!

summary judgment, moving the court to declare the listing agreements invalid for lack of
a legal description. (R., Vol. I, pp. 122-125; R., Vol. TI, Ex. 1). The court heard oral
argument by the parties on July 18, 2007 and entered an order on August 31, 2007,
granting summary judgment in favor of CBI, CPA and Silver Oaks and declaring the
listing agreements invalid for lack of an accurate legal description. (R. Voi. I, pp. 302-

3 18). This appeal followed.
In the memorandum opinion on the motion for summary judgment, Judge Sticklen
found: the identity aid exact boundaries of the Charter Pointe and Silver Oaks properties
cannot be determined from the face of the listing agreements; the listing agreements
erroneously stated that the legal descriptions were attached, when in fact no such
descriptions were affixed; and that construing controlling Idaho law, the legal
descriptions failed to satisfy the statute of frauds and failed to satisfy LC. 5 54-

2050(1)(b). (R. Vol. I, pp. 302-318).
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An Amended Judgment and I.R.C.P. 54(b) Certificate were entered on December

I
I

19, 2007, rendering judgment in favor of the CBI as to CPM's claims for unpaid

3

connnissions. (R., Vol. 11, pp. 325-329). CPM, through Callies, filed a Notice of Appeal
!

I/

on January 28, 2008, appealing the Trial court's decision regarding the validity of the

i

Agreements. (R., Vol. 11, pp. 330-335).
iii.

Statement of Facts

I

In March of 2005, CBI was the managing member of Charter Pointe and Silver
I
1

Oaks and had the authority to make business decisions and act as an agent for those
companies. (R. Ex. 2, ¶q[ 3,5). On or about March 1,2005, CPM and CBI executed two

'

RE-16 Exclusive Seller Representation Agreements (the "Agreements"); one for the
property owned by Charter Pointe and one for the property owned by Silver Oaks. (R.
Ex. 2, g[m 3-6, Exs. A-B).

The Agreements, identical in form, both stated that a "Legal

Description [was] Attached as addendum # 1" and added that the "[a]ddendnm must
accompany original listing." (R. Ex. 2, ¶¶ 3-6, Exs. A-B). At the time of execution of
the Agreements, a legal description was not attached to either of the Agreements, and
instead the properties were described as "TBD Charter Pointe" in the Charter Pointe
Agreement and "TBD Ten MileFranklin" in the Silver Oaks Agreement. (R. Ex. 2,

3-

6, Exs. A-B).
On or about March 8, 2005, CBI executed the closi~lgpapers for the acquisition of
properties which are the subject matter of the Agreements. (R. Ex. 2, ¶ 7, Ex. C). The
closing papers for those properties contained only a proposed legal description of the
properties. (R. Ex. 2, ¶ 7, Ex. C). A final legal description was not recorded for Charter
Pointe until April 11, 2006, when the Declaration of Covenants for Charter Pointe
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1
2

Village 4-Plex Condominiums was recorded with the Ada County Recorder. (R. Ex. 2,

rn

8, Ex. D). The final legal description contained in that document for CPA was created

3

after March 8,2005. (R. Ex. 2, ¶ 8, Ex. D).
4

5

Callies filed a NOTICE OF OBLIGATION TO PAY COMNIISSIONS

6

(hereinafter "Notice") dated June 7, 2006, subscribed and sworn to by Callies, and
recorded said notice as Instrument No. 106091057. (R. Ex. 3, ¶ 3, Ex. A). The Notice

8

incorporates the Charter Pointe Agreement. (R. Ex. 3,

rn 3, Ex. A). The incorporated

9
10
11

listing agreement also had no "Legal Description Attached as addendum #I.''
(R. Ex. 3,

3, EX.A).

12
13

On August 16, 2006, Callies, through her agent Taryn Dolan, requested via
facsimile that the legal description for the Silver Oaks Agreement be "added" to that

14

15

Agreement. (R. Ex. 2, q[ 9, Ex. E). On August 30,2006, Callies, through her agent Taryn
Dolan, requested via facsimile that the legal description for the CPA Agreement be

17
18

"added" to that Agreement. (R. Ex. 2, ¶ 10, Ex. F). At no time did CBI, Charter Pointe
or Silver Oaks consent to the legal descriptions being added to the Agreements. (R. Ex.

19

2,419[ 9-10).
20
21

In October of 2006, Callies sent a demand letter to CBI, which made reference to

22

"[tlhe legal description relative to the Silver Oaks listing agreement appears to have been

23

provided seven days after the listing agreement was executed." (R. Ex. 3, q[ 4, Ex. B).

24

Further, the verified complaint filed by CPM on November 8, 2006 unequivocally states
25
26
27

"

that "[all the time of the initial listing for the Charter Point (sic) properties, a final plat
had not yet been recorded wluch delineated the separate four-plexes I.. .I" (R., Vol. I, p.
80).

29
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CBI, Charter Pointe and Silver Oaks filed a motion for summary judgment on
!

April 18,2007, seeking to have the Agreements declared invalid due to the lack of a valid

I

and enforceable legal description in the Agreements. (R., Vol. I., pp. 122-125). The
Trial court heard oral argument by the parties on July 3, 2007. (R., Vol. I., p. 10). In its
opinion filed August 3 1, 2007, the Court held that the Agreements were invalid due to the

,

lack of a legally enforceable legal description and that CPM was not entitled to recover
under the theories of quasi estoppel or partial performance due to the fact that the
underlying agreements were unenforceable. (R., Vol. II., pp. 302-3 18).

2.

ISSUES PRESENTED O N APPEAL
(1)

Did the trial court err in finding that there was no genuine issue of material

fact which would have precluded the court from entering summary judgment in favor of
CBI?
(2)

I

Did the trial court err when it concluded that the Agreements were

unenforceable due to the lack of a valid and enforceable legal descriptioll of the
respective properties to be sold on the Agreements?
(3)

Was it in error for the trial court to rely on LC. $ 9-503 and I.C. $ 54-2050

when determining whether the Agreements were valid contractual agreements?
(4)

Did the trial court err in its holding that CPM was not entitled to recover

under the theories of quasi estoppel or partial performance due to the unenforceability of
the underlying Agreements?
(5)

Should the Court award CBI reasonable attorney fees and costs incurred in

this appeal, pursuant to I.A.R. 41, I.A.R. 40, Idaho Code $ 12-120(3) and Idaho Code $
12-l21?
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11

3

When reviewing a trial court's decision on a motion for suinrnary judgment, the
same standard is employed as that employed by the trial court when originally ruling on

4

II11

6

the motion. Kolln v. Saint Luke's Regional Medical Center, 130 Idaho 323, 327, 940
P.2d 1142, 1146 (1997) (citing Thnmon v Idaho Ins. Agency, Inc., 126 Idaho 527, 529,

' 11887 P.2d

1034, 1036 (1994)))).

"Suinmary judgment is proper 'if the pleadings.

8

depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is
9

no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment

10

I11

as a matter of law."'

Id. (citing I.R.C.P. 56(c)). "The moving party is entitled to a

l1
l2
13

judgment when the non-moving party 'fails to make a showing sufficient to establish h e
existence of an element essential to that party's case on which that party will bear the

14

burden of proof at trial."' Doe v. City of Elk River, 144 Idaho 337, 338, 160 P.3d 1272,

15

l6

$7

1

1273 (2007) (citing Baxter v. Craney, 135 Idaho 166, 170, 16 P.3d 263, 267 (2000)).

//"The standard for reviewing a district court's ruling on a motion for summary judgment is

la//freereview.

however [the] Court is bound by the same standards that control the district

19

court's decision." Lloyd v. DeMott, 124 Idaho 62, 65, 856 P.2d 99, 102 (1993) (citing
20

21

22

II

East LizardButte Water Corp. v. Howell, 122 Idaho 679,681, 837 P.2d 805,807 (1992)).

114.

23

ARGUMENT

I.

24

The Trial Court Was Correct When it Held There Was No Genuine
Issue of Material Fact In the Record Which Would Have Precluded
the Court From Granting Summary Judgment.

25

26
27

1

CPM, in their brief, attempt to divert attention from the relevant facts in the

I/record. specifically that the Agreements are void for lack of a legally enforceable
/description of the properties, by highlighting irrelevant disputed facts in the record. CBI

29
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1
2

is not arguing that there are no disputed facts in the record. Rather, those disputed facts
are not material to the court's decision. The applicable statute requires that a brokerage

3

representation agreement/commission agreement be written and contain a legally
4
5

enforceable description of the property being sold. LC. § 54-2050(1)(b).
There is no dispute in the record that the Agreements did not contain a valid or

6

enforceable legal description at the time they were entered into. It is clear from the
3

>
)

record that the only descriptions given of the properties contemplated by the Agreements
were "TED Charter Pointe" and "TED Ten MileIFranklin." (R., Vol. 11, Ex. 2,

¶m 3, 5,

I

Exs. A-B). It is also clear from the record that CBI at no time agreed to add legal

'

descriptions to the Agreements subsequent to their execution. (R., Vol. 11, Ex. 2, qIgI 9-

I

10). These are the only facts that are relevant to the dispute at hand.

A contract which is rendered ambiguous due to the lack of a valid and enforceable
legal description will not have the same standard applied as do other ambiguous contracts
and thus, extrinsic or parol evidence is not admissible to claify the terms of such au
agreement. White v. Rehn, 103 Idaho 1, 3, 644 P.2d 323, 325 (1982). Although the
agreement at issue in White was for the transfer of property, as compared to the
Agreements at dispute here, both still require a legal description of the property they
contemplate. That description must be able to sufficiently identify the property without
resorting to parol evidence to determine intent of the parties. "The description [cannot
be] so inadequate that to allow parol evidence and the surrounding circumstances to be
considered would be to supply a description of the property which was omitted from the
writing in order to ascertain and locate the land about which the parties negotiated." Id.
What CPM and Callies do is collfuse alteration and modification wit11 formation. An
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unenforceable agreement cannot be modified, as formation is lacking. White v. Rehn,
644 P.2d 323.
Further, a party has the right to rescind an agreement that is unenforceable. Good
v. Hansen, 110 Idaho 953, 719 P.2d 1213 (Idaho App.,1986). There is undisputed

evidence in the record that the legal descriptions were not included or attached to the
Agreements, nor had they even been created at the time of execution of the Agreements.
(R., Vol. 11, Ex. 2, g[g[ 3, 5, Exs. A-B; R., Vol. LI, Ex. 2, ¶9[ 9-10; R. Vol. I, p. 80-81,9(g[11,
16). There is also undisputed evidence in the record that shows an agent of Callies' and
3 M ' s requested that those legal descriptions be added to the Agreements in August of
2006. (R., Vol. TI, Ex. 2, ¶g[ 9-10). Even if the Agreements could have been made

fo force able by later addition of the legal descriptions, the record is clear that CBI did not
iuthorize the addition of the legal descriptions to the Agreements subsequent to their
txecution. (R., Vol. 11, Ex. 2, g[g[ 9-10). Therefore, as described in further detail below,
here is no relevant issue of material fact that would have precluded the trial court from
:ranting the CBI's motion for summary judgment as to the unenforceability of the
igreements due to the lack of valid and enforceable legal descriptions.
The facts surrounding the execution of the Agreements and the fact that those
igreements did not contain a legally enforceable description of the Charter Pointe and
:ilver Oaks properties are the only pertinent facts that should be afforded any
xamination for purposes of this appeal. They are also the only facts that should be
xamined to determine the appropriateness of the trial court's ruling that summary
~dgmentshould have been granted to CBI, deeming the Agreements unenforceable.

age 8

ii.

I

2

Idaho Code $ 54-2050 is the Controlling Statute Regarding the
Sufficiencyof Brokerage Representation Agreements, is Unambiguous
and ShouPd Be Interpreted as the Legislature Intended

3

CPM argues that the trial court erred when it applied the analysis of Garner v.
4

II
I1

Bartschi, 139 Idal~o430, 80 P.3d 1031 (2003), and further argue that LC.

5 9-508 is the

controlling statute for purposes of this appeal. Idaho Code 5 9-508 states:
REAL ESTATE COMMISSION CONTRACTS TO BE IN WRTTING.
No contract for the payment of any sum of money or thing of value, as
and for a commission or reward for the finding or procuring by one person
of a purchaser of real estate of another shall be valid ullless the same shall
be in writing, signed by the owner of such real estate, or his legal,
appointed and duly qualified representative.

I.C. 9 9-508 was originally codified in 1919, and was the colltrolling statute in the
l3

rn
l5
16

I1
/I

analysis of Central Idaho Agency, Inc. v. Turner, 92 Idaho 306,442 P.2d 442 (1968), the

case most heavily relied upon by CPM;

/I

However, the Idaho State legislature enacted the Idaho Real Estate License Law

in 2000, which created additional requirements for a valid brokerage agreement. LC.
17

I8

II

54-2001 et seq. LC.

29
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5 54-2050 specifically identifies those requirements as follows:

BROKERAGE REPRESENTATION AGREEMENTS -- REQUIRED
ELEMENTS. All real estate brokerage representation agreements,
whether with a buyer or seller, inust be in writing in the manner required
by section 54-2085, Idaho Code, and must contain the following contract
provisions: (1)
Seller representation agreements. Each seller
representation agrecment, whether exclusive or nonexclusive, inust
contain the following provisions: (a) Conspicuous and definite beginning
and expiration dates; (b) A legally enforceable description of the
property; (c) price and terms; (d) All fees or commissions; and (e) The
signature of the owner of the real estate or the owner's legal, appointed
and duly qualified representative, and the date of such signature. (3)
Prohibited provisions aud exceptions -- Automatic renewal clauses. No
buyer or seller representation agreement shall contain a provision
requiring the party signing the agreement to notify the broker of the
party's intention to cancel the agreement after the definite expiration date,
unless the representation agreement states that it is completely

5

I
2

nonexclusive and it contains no financial obligation, fee or commission
due from the party signing the agreement.

3

(Emphasis added). The legislature, when it enacted this statute in 2000, subsequent to
4
5
6

both the codification of LC. § 9-508 and the decision in Central Idaho Agency, added the
requirement that commission agreements contain a legally enforceable descriptioil of
property, as detailed in LC. 54-2050(1)(b).

8

What CPM is effectively attempting to do is to have this Court render the
3

3

language of I.C. § 54-2050(1)(b) void, and to give it no legal effect.

"It is well

r

established that statutes should be inte~pretedto mean what the legislature intended them

'

to mean." Walker v. Nationwide Financial Corporation of Idaho, 102 Idaho 266, 268,

3

629 P.2d 662, 664 (1981). "[Qt is incumbent upon [the Supreme] Court to give a statute

I-

an interpretation that will not in effect nullify it.. ." Id. (citations omitted).
This Court in Hartley v. Miller-Stephan stated that it would "assume that the
'

legislature intended what it said in a statute, and [it] will conshue statutory terms
according to their plain, obvious, and rational meanings." 107 Idaho 688, 690, 692 P.2d

I

332, 334 (1984) (ovenuled on other grounds) (citations omitted). This Court went
further to state that it would "not construe a statute in a way which makes mere
sulplusage of the provisions included therein." Id. (citations omitted). However, that is
exactly what CPM is requesting of the Supreme Court.
The language of LC. $ 54-2050 is clear and unambiguous. It is obvious that the
legislature intended brokerage representation agreements to be in writing and contain a

the legislature should not now be questioned and the governing law changed to give new

I

' / 1 meaning to plainly unambiguous statutory language.
The Supreme Court of Idaho addressed the issue of a brokerage representation

;
i

I1

agreement being unenforceable due to the lack of a legally enforceable description
subsequent to its ruling in Central Idaho Agency, which CPM is now relying on. ln

Garner v. Bartschi, both a purchase and sale agreement and a brokerage representation
I

agreement were at issue, where the brokerage representation agreement contained a
I

property description that solely stated "4565 Nounan Road, County Bear Lake, City
Nounan, Zip 83254, legally described as approx. 500 acres mountain property." 139
Idaho 430, 434, 80 P.3d 1031, 1035 (2003).
requirements of I.C.

The Supreme Court, analyzing the

5 54-2050(1)(b), stated that brokerage representation agreements are

required to be in writing and "contain a legally enforceable description of the property."
Garner at 1037. The Court found lhat the description contained in the brokerage
representation agreement at issue in Garner was "not a 'legally enforceable description of
the property' as required by LC. § 54-2050(1)(b) and LC. 5 9-503." Id.
The trial court, as in Garner, analyzed the enforceability of the Agreements
pursuant to I.C.

5 54-2050(1)(b) and found that

the legal descriptions contained in the

Agreements were not enforceable and thus did not coinply with that statute. The trial
conit further made mention of the fact that the Agreements did not comply with the
statute of frauds. The fact that the trial court simply made mention of LC.

5 9-503 does

not inem that either court intended that to be the controlling statute.
It is immaterial whether the ti-ial court applied I.C.

5 9-503 or 5 9-508. 1.C. 5 54-

2050 postdates both of those code sections and was obviously created to require

additional information to be present on a comnission agreement; that is, in addition to
Lhe requirement that the commission agreement being in writing.

I.C. § 9-508 merely

lddresses one of the requirements that I.C. § 54-2050 addresses. Where there is a general
statute, and a special or specific statute, dealing with the same subject, the provisions of
:he special or specific statute will control those of the general statute. State v. Roderick,

35 Idal~o80, 84, 375 P.2d 1005, 1007 (1962) (citations omitted). LC. 5 9-508 simply
.equires that commission agreements be in wliting; whereas I.C. $ 54-2050 not only
.equires that they be in writing, but adds five additional requirements, including that they
:ontain a legally enforceable description of the property. I.C. § 9-508 is a generalized
iersion of LC.

54-2050, therefore rendering the latter the controlling statute for

mrposes of this appeal.
Even if it were not immaterial and the trial court was incorrect in analyzing LC.
t-503 instead of LC. $ 9-508, it would be a harmless error and would not change the
mtcome of chis case. Real estate commission contracts and brokerage agreements are
equired in the State of Idaho to be written and to contain a valid legal description which
~ccuratelydescribes the property contemplated in the agreement. If the legislature had
ntended that there be no require~nentof an enforceable legal description in a cominission
greement, then they would not have enacted a statute specifically requiring such when a
tatute was already in effect that required a commission agreement to be in writing.
There is no dispute that the legal descriptio~lsfor the Charter Pointe and Silver
)aks properties were not attached to the Agreements executed on March 1,2005. In fact,
le legal description for the properties was not even generated for the properties until
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after the Agreements had been executed. Therefore, they did not meet the requirements

I

of LC. 3 54-2050 and were at no time enforceable agreements.

iii.

The Trial Court Was Correct in Concluding That the Listing
Agreements Were Unenforceable Due to the Lack o f Valid and
Enforceable Legal Description of the Properties

It is important to note that the Trial court's Memorandum Decision and Order
indicated that the summary judgment was being granted because the legal descriptions
contained on the listing agreements "did not satisfy the statute of frauds and fail[ed] to
meet the statutory requirements of LC. 5 54-2050(1)(b)." The Court did not specifically
statc that the listing agreements failed to meet the requirements of I.C.

5 9-503, but

!
I

simply included reference to that statute when it stated that the Agreements failed to meet

I the statute of frauds. Thus, CPM's argument that LC. 5 9-508 should be applied rather
than I.C. 3 9-503 is rendered ineffectual, as both code sections are encompassed within
the statute of frauds.
CPM did uot create valid, enforceable legal descriptions pursuant to Idaho law,
regardless of whether LC. § 9-503 or I.C.

5 9-508 was applied. Pursuant to Idaho law, a

commission agreement must be in writing and must contain an enforceable legal
description of the property. The Agreements in question did not contain valid and
enforceable legal descriptions. In fact, CPM did not even request that a legal description
of the property be attached until one year and five months after the Agreements were
executed and litigation between the parties had erupted. Clearly this is not allowed by
Idaho law.
Although CPM and Callies further argue that the Agreements do not state "when
the addendum must be attached to or accompany the printed contract," this argument is in
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I

error. The Agreements do in fact state that the legal descriptions must accompany the

?

original listing; and further state that such description is attached to the listing. (R. Vol.

3

11, Ex. 2, 9% 3-6, Exs. A-B). There is no factual dispute in the record that the legal
I

descriptions for Charter Pointe and Silver Oaks were not attached to the listing
agreements at the time of execution of the Agreements, nor had they even been created

;

I

1 I/
II

and finalized at the time the Agreements were entered into. Therefore, for the reasons
discussed above, the Agreements were at all times u~xenforceablefor lack of a legally

enforceable description of the Charter Pointe and Silver Oaks properties.

iv.

The Trial Court Correctly Ruled that Pard and Extrinsic Evidence
Could Not be Admitted to Supply a Legal Description to the
Agreements.

CPM illcorrectly compares the concept of listingbrokerage representation
agreements with other types of contracts; in that they argue that parol and extrinsic

I

evidence can be admitted to supply a valid and enforceable legal description to the
Agreements. However, there is a unique difference between these types of coiltractual

agreements due to statutory requirements related to commissioi~agreements; specifically,
the requirement that the agreements contain a valid and enforceable legal description.
Where a legal description is not included on an agreement which is statutorily required to
contain a valid and enforceable legal description, parol and extrinsic evidence will not be
allowed to supply such a legal description to the agreement.

Lexington Heights

Developnzent, LLC v. Crandlemire, 140 Idaho 276, 281, 92 P.3d 526, 531 (2004);
Garner, 139 Idaho at 435, 80 P.3d at 1036; and Allen v. Kitchen, 16 Idaho 133, 142, 100

The trial Court cited Lexington Heights in its memorandum decision, stating that

1
2

the general rule that a "legal description would be sufficient 'so long as quantity, identity,

3

or boundaries of property call be determined from the face of the instrument."' (R., Vol.
4
5
6

11, p. 3 11). Therefore, the Court followed Lexington Heights holding that because the
Agreements did not contain a "street address, acreage designation, or any other adequate
identification of the boundaries of the property to be conveyed, parol evidence [would]

8

not be admitted to supply any of [those] terms." Lexington Heights, 92 P.3d at 531;
9
10
11

Garner, 139 Idaho at 435,80 P.3d at 1036; and Allen v. Kitchen, 16 Idaho 133, 142, 100
P. 1052, 1054 (1909).

12
13

CPM argues that Lexington Heights and Allen do not apply because they deal with
real estate purchase and sale agreements and not with commission agreements.

14
15

However, the trial Court only compared these cases with the current dispute at hand,

1G

utilizing Garner as the controlling precedent for which it ruled that the Agreements were

17

unenforceable. Therefore, this argument by CPM is inapplicable.

18

Due to the trial court's holding regarding the disallowance of extrinsic evidence to

19

provide legal descriptions to the Agreements, where no previous legal descriptions of any
20

,

kind had been attached, the court declined to follow Central Idaho Agency, Inc. v.

22

Turner, 92 Idaho 306, 442 P.2d 442 (1968). The trial court found that the difference in

23

Central Idaho Agency from the case at bar, there was some type of legal description,

24

albeit an insufficient description. (R., Vol. 11, p. 313). However, due to the existence of
25
26
27

some type of description, parol evidence was used to supplement that description, but not
to provide it in its entirety. (R., Vol. 11, p. 313).

28
29

Page 15

This is where the facts in Central Idaho Agency differentiate from the current

t

issue at hand, as the legal descriptions clearly were uot attached to the Agreements at the
time of their execution, nor could they have been attached because they had yet to be
created. In fact, the record clearly shows that the Appellant only requested that the legal
descriptions be attached to the Agreements in August of 2006, one year and five months
following the execution of the Agreements, and at no other time. Pursuant to Idaho law,
CPM cannot now seek to supply a legal description to the Agreements where no legal
description previously existed.
Further, as the trial court further stated, Central Idaho Agency was effectively
overruled by the enactment of the Idaho Real Estate Brokers' License Law, which was
enacted in 2000; 32 years after the holding in Central Idaho Agency which CPM is now
relying on to support their position. (R., Vol. TI, p. 313). LC.

5 54-2050(1)(b), the

controlling statute as to the requirements of a brokerage representation agreement,
specifically requires that they be in writing and include a legally enforceable legal
description. Therefore, the trial court: correctly held chat Central Idaho Agency was in
essence negated by the enactment of LC.

5

54-2001 et seq. and was not precedent for

these proceedings.
As such, CPM's argument fails that par01 andlor extrinsic evidence should be
allowed to supply legal descriptions to the Agreements when legal descriptions were not
originally affixed as required by both the express language of the Agreements, and by
daho law.

'age 16

v.

I
2

The Trial Court was Correct in Dismissal of CPM's Claims to
Recover on the Theories of Quasi Estoppel and the Doctrine o f Part
Performaa~ce

The law regarding the necessity of an enforceable legal descriptiou in listing

/I

contracts has evolved over time; this evolution comes full circle to the current state of the

1

law and is important when considering CPM's equitable arguments. CBI provided the

' Ildistrist court with detailed analysis of this evolution in its summary judgment
I

memorandum, but provides a summary version of that history here for the Court's
3
I

!

I/

convenie~~ce.
Initially, Idaho courts required a legally enforceable property description,
and eliminated the applicability of equitable remedies. such as the doctrine of part

//performance.

I/

I
I
11

1
//

This was eroded by judicial decisions, legislative enactments overruled

these judicial decisions, aud recently we have judicial acknowledgment that a listing
contract requires a legally enforceable description of the property that satisfies the statute

of frauds and, furthermore, that equitable defenses do not apply. See Weatherhead v.

Cooney, 32 Idaho 127, 180 P. 760 (1919), Murphy v. Livesay, 34 Idaho, 793, 197 P. 536

(1921), Laker Land & Loans v. Nye, 40 Idaho 793,237 P. 630 (1925), Robison v. Frasier,
89 Idaho 326. 404 P 2 d 877 (1965), Central Idaho Agency v. Turner, 92 Idaho 306, 442
~ . 2 412
d (1968), LC. $9-503,I.C. $9-508, I.C. (54-2050 (2000) and Garner v Bartschi,

139 Idaho 430.80 P 3 d 1031 (2003).

II

In short, the Court has returned to the legal standard stated in Weatherhead:

Page 17

[t]o hold that performance takes a claim of this character out of the
operation of the statute would, in our opinion, leave nothing for the
statute to operate on. Such construction would render the statute
useless and meaningless and would be tantamount to saying that
ally contract for a commission or reward for the finding or
procuring of a purchaser of the real estate of another is valid,
though not in writing and not signed by the owner of such real

estate, which is directly opposite to the expressed will of the
legislature.
ee Weatherhead, at 128.
As noted in 41 A.L.R. 2d 905, the return to Weatherhead places Idaho with the
iajority of states on this issue regarding com~nissionagreements. In particular the
.eport notes the conclusion of the American Law Institute as supported by the
estate~nentsthat a real estate brolcer calnot recover under equity without compliance
,ith the governing statutes. In particular, the Report cites Restatement, Contracts $ 355

0, Illustration 7, which states:
It is provided by statute that a real estate broker shall have no right
to a commission for making a sale unless he has a contract or
authority in writing from his principal. A broker who makes a sale
for his principal without such written contract or authority cannot
get judgment for the value of his services.
Furthermore, the Report cites Restatement, Agency $ 468, Comment subsec (2),
hich states:
Statutes similar to the one stated in this Subsection are not
infrequently enacted with reference to contracts with brokers. The
~nemorandumcommonly required under such statutes is one which
describes the thing to be sold and the terms of compensation. In the
absence of such a inemorandurn, the employer, although benefited
by ihe service of the agent who has been orally employed by him,
is under no duty to give compensation in any form. As stated in
414 (3), however, unless the principal is willing to make a
memorandum, the agent is under no duty to perform.
The Report concludes that cases anply bear out the foregoing conclusions of the
:statements, and that the overwhelming weight of authority holds that if the broker's
ting contract does not satisfy a statute providing that a contract for compeilsation or
mmissions for procuring a purchaser for real property must be in writing, or a lilce
iute, the broker cannot recover under equitable principles. See 41 A.L.R. Zd 905 $31~1.

I

CPM argues that regardless of the enforceability of the Agreements, CPM is

2

entitled to recovcr cormnissions based upon their alleged reliance on the Agreements.

3

However, CPM bad no right to rely on an unenforceable agreement. Idaho law does not
4

5

provide any equitable remedy where the underlying listing agreement is unenforceable.

6

For the reasons set forth in Weatherhead, CPM's arguments lack merit.

7

1.

8

The doctrine of quasi-estoppel "prevents a party from asserting a right, to the

9
10

Quasi Estoppel Does Not Apply Where There is No
Enforceable Underfying Agreement.

detriment of another party, which is inconsistent with a position previously taken."

11

Atwood v. Smith, 143 Idaho 110, 138 P.3d 310 (2006) (citing C & G, Inc. v. Canyon
12
13

Highway Dist. No. 4, 139 Idaho 140, 144, 75 P.3d 194, 198 (2003)). "This doctrine

14

applies when: (1) the offellding party took a different position than his or her original

15

position and (2) either (a) the offending party gained an advantage or caused a

16

disadvantage to the other party; (b) the other party was induced to change positions; or
17
18

(c) it would be unconscionable to permit the offending party to maintain an inconsistent

19

position froin one he or she has already derived a benefit or acquiesced in." Id.; Thomas

20

v. Arkoosh Produce, Inc., 137 Idaho 352, 357, 48 P.3d 1241, 1246 (2002). "To prove

21

quasi-estoppel, it is not necessary to show detrimental reliance; instead, there must be
22
23
24
25
26

evidence that it would be ui~conscionableto permnit the offending party to assert allegedly
contrary positions." Id. (citing Thomas, 137 at 357,48 P.3d at 1246).
"Unlike equitable estoppel, quasi estoppel does not require a misrepresentation by
one party or actual reliance by the other." Medical Services Group, Inc. v. Boise Lodge

27

No. 310, Benev. and Protective Order of Elks, 126 Idaho 90, 96, 878 P.2d 789, 795
28

2g

(1994) (citing Keesee v. Fetzek, 111 Idaho 360, 362, 723 P.2d 904, 906 (Ct.App.1986)).
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2

gained some advantage for himself, produced some disadvantage to the person seeking

3

the estoppel, or induced such party to change his position." Id. III addition it inust be
1

unconscionable to allow the person against whom the estoppel is sought to maintain a

5

position which is illcoilsistent with the one in which he accepted a benefit. Id. (citing

j

'

11

Tommerup v Albertsonk Inc., 101 Idaho 1, 607 P.2d 1055 (1980) (overruled on other

I

grounds)).
v

However, "[pjromissory estoppel is siinply a substitute for consideration, not a

I

substitute for an agreement between parties." Letturzich v. Key Bank Nut. Ass'n
141 Idaho 362, 367-368, 109 P.3d 1104, 1109-1110 (2005). (citing Smith v. Boise

Kenworth Sales, Inc., 102 Idaho 63, 68, 625 P.2d 417, 422 (1981)). "Consideration
includes 'action by the promisee which is bargained for and given in exchange for the
promise."' Id. (citing Day v. Mortgage Ins. Corp., 91 Idaho 605, 607, 428 P.2d 524, 526
(1967)). "It may also consist of a 'detriment to the promisee or a benefit to the
promisor."' Id. (citing Surety L$e Ins. Co. v. Rose Chapel Mortuary, Inc., 95 Idaho 599,
603,514 P.2d 594,598 (1973)).

In Lettunich, the court found that although one party had "clearly suffered a
detriment when he purchased cattle without a way to pay for them ...[t]he doctrine of
promissory estoppel [was] of no consequence in [that] case because there [was] evidence
of adequate consideration. What [was] lacking [was] a sufficiently definite agreement."

Id. (citing Black Canyon Racquetball v. First Nat'l, 119 Idaho 171, 178, 804 P.2d 900,
907 (1991)). Therefore, the Supreme Court held that in the absence of an enforceable
agreement, the doctrine of part performance and equitable estoppel did not apply. The
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:ou~-t found that "even though it could be inferred that Lettunich partially
erformed.. .there is no evidence in the record of a complete and enforceable agreement."
(ettunichat 1109.
The same is true in these circumstances. Although CPM claims that they partially
erformed by finding purchasers to enter into purchase and sale agreements for the
urchase of units in the Charter Pointe and Silver Oaks project, and expended funds on
ke same, there are two fatal flaws to CPM's argument. First, there is no evidence in the
:cord of the funds purportedly expended by the appellant in reliance on the Agreements.
zcondly, as explained in detail above, there is no evidence in the record that contradicts
e fact that no legal description accompanied the Agreements when they were executed
1

required by both the Agreements and by Idaho statute. Further, CPM failed to put any

ridence into the record that CBI, Charter Pointe or Silver Oaks were in some way
sponsible for the fact that the Agreements did not contain valid enforceable legal
:scriptions.
Therefore, the lack of factual evidence in the record that supports CPM's claims
reliance, coupled with the unenforceability of the Agreements, renders CPM's claims
quasi estoppel and partial performance inapplicable to the current dispute.

vi.

CPM is Not Entitled to Attorney Fees and Costs Pursuant to the
Agreements Due to the Unenforceability of the Agreements.

To the extent that CPM is requesting an award of fees and Costs from the Court
appeal pursuant to the terms of the Agreements, the Court should deny said request
e to the unenforceability of the Agreements as explained above.

vii.

1

2

I11(

CBI is Entitled to an Award ~f Attorneys' Fees and Costs on Appeal
Pursuant to I.A.R. 40 and I.A.R. 41

There are no disputed facts that would have precluded the trial court from

gxanting summary judgment. Summary judgment was properly granted by the trial court

5

and said decision should not be overturned on appeal. Therefore, CBI should recover all

6

attorneys' fees and costs incurred as the prevailing party on appeal.

7

viii.

8

9

1

I/

The Court Should Award CBI Reasonable Attorney Fees and Costs
Incurred in this Appeal, Pursuant to I.A.R. 40, I.A.R. 41, Idaho Code
9 12-120(3)and Idaho Code 9 12-121.

The case of Garner v. Bartsclzi is analogous to the case at hand, and supports an

award of attorney fees and costs to Respondent incurred in responding to this appeal.
?

Idaho Code 5 12-120(3) states:

3

In any civil action to recover on an open account, account stated, note,
relating to the purchase
bill, negotiable instrument, guaranty, or co~~tract
or sale of goods, wares, merchandise, or services and in any commercial
transaction unless otherwise provided by law, the prevailing party shall be
allowed a reasonable attorney's fee to be set by the court, to be taxed and
collected as costs.

' I16'Theaward of attorney fees is not warranted every time a commercial transaction is
I

remotely connected with the case. Rather, the test is whether the commercial transaction
I

II

comprises the gravamen of the lawsuit. Attorney's fees are not appropriate under LC. 5

II
1I1

12-120(3) unless the commercial transaction is integral to the claim, and constitutes the

1

The Court in Garner cited Hilbert v Hough, 132 Idaho 203, 207, 969 P.2d 836,

basis upon which the party is attempting to recover." Garner at 1040 (citing Brower v.

E.I. DuPont De Nernouurs & Co., 117 Idaho 780,784,792 P2d 345, 349 (1990)),

840 (Ct.App.1998), stating that "[ilt is of no consequence that the underlying contractual
obligation is unenforceable. A prevailing party may recover attorney fees even though
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no liability under a contract was established or where no contract was, in fact, ever
formed." Garner at 1040. Here, like in Garner, the Agreements contain language in
Paragraph 23 of the Agreements, which states:
"[iln the event either party shall initiate any suit or actio11or appeal on any
matter relating to this Agreement h e defaulting party shall pay the
prevailing party all damages and expenses resulting from the default,
including all reasonably attorneys' fees and all court costs and all other
expenses incurred by the prevailing party."

:R., Vol. 11, Ex. 2, ¶¶ 3,5, EXS.A-B).
As in Garner, due to the fact that the commercial transaction was the gravamen of
he lawsuit, and although unenforceable, the Agreements provide for an award of
~ttorney'sfees to the prevailing party, CBI should be awarded their attorney's fees and
:osts for defending this appeal
Further, attorney's fees are to be awarded if the Court finds, from the facts
)resentedto it "that the case was brought, pursued, or defended frivolously unreasoiiably
a without foundation." See Idaho Code $ 12-121. Clearly this appeal was brought
rivolonsly, as the Agreements clearly were unenforceable, and therefore, CBI should be
ntitled to ail award of attorneys' fees pursuant to I.C. $ 12-121.

CONCLUSION
In light of the well established legal principles governing this case, and the facts
I

record, there is simply no identifiable error by the trial court in the proceedings

icident to the grant of summary judgment. Furthermore, there is no legal authority for
verturning grant of summary judgment. The Court should entirely affirm the decisions
F the trial court.
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Additionally, for the reasons set forth above, the facts and circumstances of this
ppeal certainly seem to warrant an award of attorney fees and costs to CBI for the
xpenses they have incurred in responding to the appeal. CBI therefore respectfully
:quests leave to submit a memorandum of costs and fees in accord with IAR 40 and 41
pon issuance of a decision by the Court.

6
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